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ABSTRACT
The revolution in computer hardware, especially in graph-
ics processing units and tensor processing units, has en-
abled significant advances in computer graphics and arti-
ficial intelligence algorithms. In addition to their many
beneficial applications in daily life and business, computer-
generated/manipulated images and videos can be used for ma-
licious purposes that violate security systems, privacy, and so-
cial trust. The deepfake phenomenon and its variations enable
a normal user to use his or her personal computer to easily
create fake videos of anybody from a short real online video.
Several countermeasures have been introduced to deal with
attacks using such videos. However, most of them are tar-
geted at certain domains and are ineffective when applied to
other domains or new attacks. In this paper, we introduce
a capsule network that can detect various kinds of attacks,
from presentation attacks using printed images and replayed
videos to attacks using fake videos created using deep learn-
ing. It uses many fewer parameters than traditional convolu-
tional neural networks with similar performance. Moreover,
we explain, for the first time ever in the literature, the theory
behind the application of capsule networks to the forensics
problem through detailed analysis and visualization.
Index Terms— computer-manipulated video, computer-
generated video, replay attack, deepfake, forgery detection,
capsule network.
1. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the invention of photography, people have been in-
terested in manipulating photographs, mainly to correct prob-
lems in the photos or to enhance them. However, we have
gone far beyond these basic manipulations to adding unreal
figures and inserting or removing objects. Digital photogra-
phy has simplified the manipulation process, especially with
the help of professional software like the iconic Adobe Pho-
toshop application. The advent of personal computers fur-
ther enabled people to become creators, creating everything
from scratch. We call this computer graphics, as opposed to
Fig. 1. Example fake images. The first two images in
the top row were fully computer-generated (from the Digi-
tal Emily Project [1] and from Dexter Studios [2]); the last
one was generated using StyleGAN [3]. In the bottom row,
from left to right, are images manipulated using deepfake [4],
Face2Face [5], and Neural Textures [6] methods, respectively.
computer vision, which is aimed at making computers un-
derstand things from captured images and videos. The co-
existence and co-development of computer graphics and com-
puter vision, with the support of advanced hardware, have led
to significant achievements. Moreover, the popularity of so-
cial networks has enabled people to create and share massive
amounts of data, including personal information, news, and
media, like images and videos. The consequence is that peo-
ple with malicious purposes can easily make use of these ad-
vanced technologies and data to create fake images and videos
and then publish them widely on social networks or use them
to bypass facial authentication.
The requirements for manipulating or synthesizing videos
were dramatically simplified when it became possible to cre-
ate forged videos from only a short video of the target per-
son [5, 7] and then from a single ID photo [8] following the
acting of an actor. Suwajanakorn et al.’s mapping method [9]
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enhanced the ability of manipulators to learn the mapping be-
tween speech and lip motion. Since state-of-the-art speech
synthesis methods can produce natural sounding speech, this
mapping method enabled the creation of a fully synthesized
audio-video image of any person. Deepfakes [4] exemplify
this threat – any user with a personal computer and an ap-
propriate tool can create videos impersonating any celebrity.
Since deepfakes have become easy to create, a large number
of high-quality fake pornography videos have been produced.
Deepfake comedy and deepfake videos have been posted on
YouTube with the challenge being to spot them. Several ex-
amples of computer-generated/manipulated images are shown
in Fig. 1.
Several countermeasures have been developed for detect-
ing spoofing attacks using fake images and videos. Before
the deepfake phenomenon [4], when computer-generated im-
ages and videos had not yet achieved the required realistic
quality to become a threat, presentation attacks [10] were
the main concern, and the detectors used hand-crafted fea-
tures [11, 12, 13]. The growing use of convolutional neural
networks (CNNs) has changed the game drastically for both
defenders and attackers. Automatic feature extraction has
dramatically improved detection performance [14, 15] while
deep generative methods like generative adversarial networks
(GANs) enable images [3] and videos [16, 17] to be produced
that are almost humanly impossible to detect as fake. The at-
tention of the forensics community has thus shifted to these
new kinds of attacks [18, 19, 20, 21]. Several approaches
are image-based [22, 23] while others work only on videos
frames [18, 20, 21] or on video frames and voice informa-
tion [24]. Although some video-based approaches perform
better than image-based ones, they are only applicable to par-
ticular kinds of attacks. For example, many of them [18, 20]
may fail if the quality of the eye area is sufficiently good or
the synchronization between the video and audio parts is suf-
ficiently natural [19]. Among the image-based approaches,
some are general-purpose detectors, for instance, Fridrich
and Kodovsky’s one [25] (applicable to both steganalysis and
facial reenactment video detection) and Rahmouni et al.’s
one [26] (applicable initially to computer-generated images
and later to computer-manipulated images). However, their
performance on new tasks is limited compared with that of
task-specific ones [23, 27].
This journal paper is an extension of our conference
paper [28] in which we pioneered the use of capsule net-
works [29, 30] for digital media forensics problems. We aim
to create a lightweight and general-purpose detector that can
be used for any kind of attack and have reasonable perfor-
mance compared with that of task-specific detectors. While
most state-of-the-art detectors use traditional CNNs with a
large number of parameters, ours uses a new type of CNN
that has impressive performance on computer vision tasks.
The network architecture is relatively new and has seen lit-
tle application in other domains, and a detailed analysis of it
has been lacking. To fill this gap, we explain the novelty of
our proposed capsule network through detailed analysis and
visualization of several kinds of attacks. We also describe
how we enhanced its performance by making several modifi-
cations and introducing two regularizations.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section, we first introduce several state-of-the-art face
manipulation techniques that can be used to manipulate faces.
We then mention several major research efforts focused on
forgery detection during the eight years preceding our re-
search, the time period when CNNs blossomed and came to
dominate traditional methods. As best we can, we group them
into presentation attack detection and computer-generated im-
age/video detection on the basis of the features they use and
their intended targets. Despite this categorization, some ap-
proaches are two-fold or can be successfully applied outside
their original scopes. Finally, we provide basic information
about capsule networks, the dynamic routing algorithm that
enables them to be efficiently implemented, and their original
application to computer vision.
2.1. Face Manipulation
Although face manipulation is not new, recent achievements
demonstrate that computer-manipulated faces can reach a
photo-realistic level at which it is almost impossible for them
to be humanly detected as fake. Dale et al. [31] presented a 3D
multilinear model for replacing facial movements in video.
Garrido et al. [32] modified the lip movements of an actor in
a target video so that they matched a different audio track.
Thies et al. [5] demonstrated that expression transfer for fa-
cial reenactment can be performed in real time and subse-
quently developed the FaceVR algorithm [33], which handles
eye-tracking and reenactment in virtual reality. Kim et al. [7]
demonstrated the transfer of a head pose along with facial
movements from an actor to another person. Similarly, Tripa-
thy et al. [16] devised a lightweight face reenactment method
using GANs. Nirkin et al. [17] presented a face swapping
method that does not require training on new faces, unlike
deepfake methods [4]. Thies et al. combined the traditional
graphics pipeline with learnable components to deal with im-
perfect 3D contents [6].
Not only visual part, Suwajanakorn et al. [9] presented
a method for learning the mapping between speech and lip
movements in which speech can also be synthesized, en-
abling creation of a full-function spoof video. Fried et al. [34]
demonstrated that speech can be easily modified in any video
in accordance with the intention of the manipulator while
maintaining a seamless audio-visual flow. Averbuch-Elor et
al. [8] addressed a different problem – converting still por-
traits into motion pictures expressing various emotions. This
work greatly simplified the requirements for attackers: sim-
ply acquire a picture of the victim (usually a profile picture
on a social network or an ID photo). Zakharov et al. [35] fol-
lowed up by improving the quality of videos generated using
only a few input images. Vougioukas et al. [36] raised the bar
by introducing a method for animating a facial image from an
audio track containing speech.
Besides these academic efforts, deep-learning-based face
swapping tools (like deepfake’s source code1) have become
widespread on the Internet, enabling normal users to create
pornographic videos with celebrity images or to imperson-
ate them. For users who are not familiar with programming
and machine learning, there is a mobile app called Xpression2
that provides a deepfake function. An even more controver-
sial application recently appeared – DeepNude [37], which
generates realistic nude images of a person from a picture of
him or her wearing clothes. It was shut down hours after it
was released due to negative reaction from the community.
2.2. Presentation Attack Detection
A presentation attack against a biometric capture system is an
attack with the goal of interfering with the system’s operation.
Presentation attack detection (PAD) methods have been de-
veloped to automatically detect this kind of attack. Local bi-
nary patterns and their variances were the most effective PAD
features in the pre-deep learning era and are used in several
methods [11, 12, 13]. Following the success of methods based
on CNNs in the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition
Challenge (ILSVRC) [38], several methods have been devel-
oped that leverage the pre-trained CNNs in this Challenge’s
large database as their feature extractors [39, 14]. Other meth-
ods have been developed that use the available CNN architec-
tures with customized components and were trained on spoof-
ing databases [40, 41, 15, 42, 43]. Besides that, Alotaibi and
Mahmood [44] applied nonlinear diffusion based on an addi-
tive operator splitting scheme to their CNN.
There is growing interest in generalizing detectors to en-
able them to handle unseen attacks [45]. This is a difficult
but important effort since the number of attack techniques
and their variances have been increasing rapidly. The major
directions for countermeasure are using adversarial training
and domain-adaptation jointly or independently [46, 47, 48].
Other directions are semi-supervised learning [49] and semi-
supervised learning combined with multi-task learning [50].
On the other hand, Fatemifar et al. [51] applied a fusion-based
multiple one-class classifier approach to anomaly detection.
2.3. Computer-Generated/Manipulated Image/Video De-
tection
Although computer-manipulation of images and videos is
nothing new, the introduction of deep learning significantly
1https://github.com/deepfakes/faceswap
2https://xpression.jp/
improved the ability of this kind of attack and thus attracted
great attention from the forensics community. This resulted
in the creation of standardized databases for benchmarking,
like the FaceForensics [23], FaceForensics++ [27], and Deep-
FakeTIMIT databases [19]. These databases cover several
well-known attacks, including Face2Face [5], FaceSwap [27],
and deepfake [4]. Rahmouni et al. had previously created a
database for detecting fully computer-generated images [26]
while Afchar et al. [22] created a deepfake database in their
pioneering deepfake detection work.
The handcrafted steganalysis-based method developed by
Fridrich and Kodovsky [25] was used in early efforts to de-
tect computer-manipulated images and videos. This approach
was later implemented in a CNN by Cozzolino et al. [52].
Subsequently, several methods based on CNNs which have
been used in the ILSVRC, like the one developed by Rossler
et al. [23]. Other methods used networks proposed by their
authors [53, 26, 54, 22, 18, 24, 21] while others are based
on a hybrid approach [55, 56, 57, 28]. Beside deep-learning
and non-deep-learning categorization, these methods could be
divided into image-based classifiers [53, 55, 26, 54, 22, 23,
56, 57, 28] and video-based classifiers [18, 24, 20, 21]. For
detecting images generated by GANs, Marra et al. [58] per-
formed benchmark testing on several CNNs and proposed a
statistical model for detection [59].
In addition to binary classification between real and modi-
fied/generated images or videos, locating manipulated regions
in images is also a major branch in digital media forensics.
This research focuses on detecting removal, copy-move, and
splicing attacks. Besides forensic-oriented approaches [60,
61, 62, 50], semantic segmentation approaches [63, 64] and
binary classification approaches are applicable [26, 56, 23,
27]. In the case of binary classifiers, a sliding window (with
or without overlapping) is used to locate manipulated regions.
2.4. Capsule Networks
“Capsule network” is not the new term as it was first intro-
duced in 2011 by Hinton et al. [29]. They argued that CNNs
have limited applicability to the “inverse graphics” problem
and introduced a more robust architecture comprising several
“capsules.” However, they initially faced the same problem
faced by CNNs – the limited performance of hardware and
the lack of effective algorithms, which prevented practical ap-
plication of capsule networks. CNNs thus remained dominant
in this research field.
These problems were overcome when the dynamic rout-
ing algorithm [30] and its variance – the expectation-
maximization routing algorithm [65] – were introduced in
2017 and 2018, respectively. These breakthroughs enabled
capsule networks to achieve better performance and outper-
form CNNs on object classification tasks [30, 66, 65, 67, 68].
The agreements between low- and high-level capsules that en-
code the hierarchical relationships between objects and their
parts with pose information enables a capsule network to pre-
serve more information than a CNN while using only a frac-
tion of the data used by a CNN.
In another domain, Iesmantas and Alzbutas applied a cap-
sule network based on binary classification to breast can-
cer detection [69]. Jaiswal et al. reported a capsule-based
GAN [70]. Yang et al. applied a capsule network to the text
domain [71]. Nguyen et al. were pioneers in applying capsule
networks to the digital media forensics problem [28]. These
efforts demonstrated the effectiveness of capsule networks in
multiple domains, which motivated us to continue developing
a method for detecting modified/generated images or videos
that we call “Capsule-Forensics” and then to perform a deep
analysis on its behaviors by visualizing its intermediate ac-
tivations on both real and fake inputs to explain the theory
behind it.
3. CAPSULE-FORENSICS
3.1. Overview
Part of
pre-trained
VGG-19
Capsule
Network
Pre-
processing
Post-
processing
Fig. 2. Capsule-Forensics pipeline.
The pipeline of our proposed Capsule-Forensics method
is illustrated in Fig. 2. The pre-processing task depends on
the input. If the input is video, the first step is to separate
the frames. If the task is to detect fully computer-generated
frames (or images), each frame (or image) is divided into
patches. If the task is to detect a fake face or faces, a face
detection algorithm is used to crop the facial area(s). There
is no strict requirement about the size of the output image.
In general, the larger the input, the better the result, at the
cost of more computational power. The commonly used im-
age sizes in practice are 100 × 100, 128 × 128, 256 × 256,
and 299× 299 [26, 28, 56, 23, 27]. We used an image size of
300× 300 as it is an even number (making it easy to perform
cropping and scaling) and large enough to provide sufficient
information for detecting fake content.
The pre-processed image then passes through a part of
the VGG-19 network (as proposed by the Visual Geometry
Group) [72] pre-trained on the ILSVRC database [38] before
entering the capsule network. The VGG-19 network is used
from the first layer to the third max pooling layer, which is not
too deep to obtain biases from the object detection task (the
original purpose of this pre-trained network). This VGG-19
part is equivalent to the CNN part before the primary capsules
in the design of the original capsule network [30]. Using a
pre-trained CNN as a feature extractor rather than training it
from scratch provides the benefit of using it as a regularizer
to guide the training and to reduce overfitting as well as that
of transfer learning. The detailed architecture is discussed in
the next section.
The final part is the post-processing unit, which works in
accordance with the pre-processing one. If the task is to detect
fully computer-generated images, the scores of the extracted
patches are averaged. If the input is video, the scores of all
frames are averaged. This average score is the final output.
3.2. Detailed Architecture
The capsule network includes several primary capsules and
two output capsules (“real” and “fake”), as illustrated in
Fig. 3. There is no constraint on the number of primary
capsules. Experiments demonstrated that a reasonably large
number of primary capsules may improve network perfor-
mance, but at the cost of more computation power. Three
capsules are typically used for light networks (which require
less memory and computation), and ten capsules are typically
used for full ones (which require more memory and compu-
tation but provide better performance). While it is not neces-
sary to use the same architecture for the primary capsules, we
used the same design for all primary capsules to simplify the
discussion.
Each primary capsule is divided into three parts: a 2D
convolutional part, a statistical pooling layer, and a 1D convo-
lutional part. The statistical pooling layer has been proven to
be effective in the forensics task [26, 56]. Moreover, it helps
make the network independent of the input image size. This
means that one Capsule-Forensics architecture can be applied
to different problems with different input sizes without hav-
ing to redesign the network. The mean and variance of each
filter are calculated in the statistical pooling layer.
• Mean:
µk =
1
H ×W
H∑
i=1
W∑
j=1
Ikij
.
• Variance:
σ2k =
1
H ×W − 1
H∑
i=1
W∑
j=1
(Ikij − µk)2
,
where k represents the layer index, H and W are respectively
the height and width of the filter, and I is a two-dimensional
filter array.
The output of the statistical layer is suitable for 1D con-
volution. After going through the following 1D convolutional
part, it is sent through dynamic routing to the output capsules.
The final result is calculated on the basis of the activation of
the output capsules. The algorithm is discussed in detail in the
next section. For binary classification, there are two output
capsules, as shown in Fig. 3. Multi-class classification could
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Fig. 3. Capsule-Forensics architecture.
be performed by adding more output capsules, as described in
section 4.1.
3.3. Dynamic Routing Algorithm
The dynamic routing algorithm is used to calculate agree-
ment between the features extracted by the primary capsules.
Agreement is dynamically calculated at run-time and the re-
sults are routed to the appropriate output capsule (real or fake
one for binary classification). The output probabilities are de-
termined on the basis of the activations of the output capsules.
This dynamic routing algorithm differs from the classical fu-
sion one in that it combines classification outputs from differ-
ent classifiers.
Let us call the output vector of each primary capsule u(i)
and the real and fake vector capsules v(1) and v(2), respec-
tively. W(i,j) is the matrix used to route u(i) to v(j), and r
is the number of iterations. The dynamic routing algorithm is
shown in Algorithm 1.
We slightly improved the algorithm of Sabour et al. [30]
by introducing two regularizations: adding random noise to
the routing matrix and adding a dropout operation. They are
used only during training to reduce overfitting. Their effec-
tiveness is discussed in the Evaluation section. Furthermore,
a squash function (equation 1) is applied to u(i) before rout-
ing to normalize it, which helps stabilize the training process.
The squash function is used to scale the vector magnitude to
unit length.
squash(u) =
‖u‖22
1 + ‖u‖22
u
‖u‖2 (1)
Algorithm 1 Dynamic routing between capsules.
procedure ROUTING(u(i),W(i,j), r)
Wˆ(i,j) ←W(i,j) + rand(size(W(i,j)))
uˆ(i) ← Wˆ(i,j)squash(u(i))
uˆ(i) ← dropout(uˆ(i))
for all input capsule i and all output capsules j do
bi,j ← 0
for r iterations do
for all input capsules i do ci ← softmax(bi)
for all output capsules j do sj ←
∑
i ci,j uˆ
(i)
for all output capsules j do v(j) ← squash(sj)
for all input capsules i and output capsules j do
b(i,j) ← bi,j + uˆ(i)ᵀv(j)
return v(j)
In practice, to stabilize the training process, the ran-
dom noise should be sampled from a normal distribution
(N (0, 0.01)), the dropout ratio should not be greater than 0.05
(we used 0.05 in all experiments), and two iterations (r = 2)
should be used in the dynamic routing algorithm. The two
regularizations are used along with random weight initializa-
tion to increase the level of randomness, which helps the pri-
mary capsules to learn with different parameters.
To calculate predicted label yˆ, we apply the softmax
function to each dimension of the output capsule vectors to
achieve stronger polarization rather than simply using the
length of the output capsules [30]. The final results are the
means of all softmax outputs:
yˆ =
1
m
∑
i
softmax
([
v(1)ᵀ
v(2)ᵀ
]
:,i
)
. (2)
Since there is no reconstruction in Capsule-Forensics, we
simply use the cross-entropy loss function (equation 3) and
the Adam optimizer [73] to optimize the network:
L = − (y log(yˆ) + (1− y) log(1− yˆ)) , (3)
where y is the ground truth label, yˆ is the predicted label, and
m is the dimensional of the output capsule vj .
3.4. How Capsule-Forensics Works
To illustrate how Capsule-Forensics works, we used a
Capsule-Forensics network with three primary capsules
trained on the FaceForensics++ database [27]. We applied
both regularizations (using random noise and dropout during
training) and used images cropped to 300×300. For visualiza-
tion, we applied and modified an open-source tool [74] imple-
menting the guided back-propagation algorithm [75]. To vi-
sualize each primary capsule in this way, we chose the latent
features extracted before the statistical pooling layers since
they still had the 2D structure.
The first question we address is about capsule learning:
What did each capsule learn and were the learned features the
same given that capsules had the same architecture? Before
training a neural net or a capsule network, weight initializa-
tion needs to be applied (in our case, we used a normal dis-
tribution for weight ninitialization). Therefore, their starting
points differed. During the learning process, these initial dif-
ferences forced each capsule to focus on features that may be
near but not identical to the others. The activation of each cap-
sule and of the whole network are illustrated in Fig. 4. The
differences in activation among capsules and between each
capsule and the whole network are also shown. The regions of
interest mainly include the eyes, nose, mouth region, and fa-
cial contours. Several capsules missed some of these regions,
and several failed to detect the manipulated input (e.g., the
3rd capsule in Fig 5). However, thanks to the agreements be-
tween the capsules driven by the dynamic routing algorithm,
the final results mostly focused on the important regions de-
tected by all capsules. If the Capsule-Forensics network was
replaced by a CNN using only the third primary capsule, the
CNN would also fail to detect the manipulated input.
Since detecting manipulated images is the forensics prob-
lem addressed here, the behavior of the Capsule-Forensics
network is differs from that in the explanation of the original
capsule network for the inverse graphics problem, in which
the focus is on the spatial hierarchies between simple and
complex objects [29, 30, 65]. In the forensics problem, abnor-
mal appearances are the key features, so each primary capsule
tries its best to capture them and communicate its findings to
the other capsules. This behavior is similar to that of jurors
during a trial, and the judgment is the final detection result.
The second question we address is about the activation of
the network given real input: Given real input, does the net-
work still focus on the same regions as fake input? A capsule
networks has output capsules equal in number to the number
of labels. Therefore, real inputs also trigger the capsule net-
works, as illustrated in Fig. 6. The activation areas were sim-
ilar to those for the fake inputs, mostly focused on the eyes,
nose, mouth region, and facial contours. The agreement be-
tween primary capsules was the same as with the fake input.
Given the behaviors in both cases, we concluded that, regard-
less of the input type, the primary capsules focus on specific
areas and test them to determine they are original or manip-
ulated. The results are then routed to the appropriate output
capsule (real or fake one for binary classification). The algo-
rithm then calculates the agreement for both the real and fake
output capsules. The stronger the agreement for a capsule, the
more certain the label.
The third question is about agreement between the pri-
mary capsules for time series (video) input: What is the be-
havior of the agreement during time? To answer this ques-
tion, we tested the Capsule-Forensics network on a deepfake
video and captured the activation of the real and fake cap-
sules before the softmax function was applied. The results are
plotted in Figs. 7 and 8. We took the output before the soft-
max function because the values are separated more and thus
easier to distinguish in the plots. Each output capsule was a
4-dimensional vector, and the dynamic routing algorithm cal-
culated agreement for all primary capsules on each dimension
of the output capsules. As we can see from the two figures,
agreement varied over time and differed between dimensions.
Near the end of the video, there were a few frames that caused
disagreements between the primary capsules. However, be-
cause we took the average of the agreements over the four
dimensions, these disagreements were partially canceled out.
Furthermore, the primary capsules had stronger agreement for
the fake capsule than for the real capsule; therefore, the final
results were still correct. It is important to note that this type
of ‘high level fusion’ is performed on latent features, unlike
traditional probabilistic ensemble fusion.
4. EVALUATION
In our evaluation of the proposed method, we first tested
the improvements made to the Capsule-Forensics network:
(1) using a larger input size (300 × 300), (2) using dropout
on training, and (3) using a larger number of primary cap-
sules (ten). To make the results more convincing, we tested
these settings on a large and challenging database – the
FaceForensics++ database [27], which focuses on computer-
manipulated images and videos. After figuring out the best
settings, we evaluated its ability to detect fully computer-
generated images and presentation attacks.
Capsule 1 Capsule 2 Capsule 3 Whole network(final)Input
Manipulated
region
1 - 2 1 - 3 2 - 3 1 - final 2 - final 3 - final
Fig. 4. Activation of the three capsules and the whole Capsule-Forensics network (columns 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively) on
images created using deepfake [4] (row 1), Face2Face [5] (row 3), and FaceSwap [27] (row 5) methods. Column 6 shows the
manipulated regions corresponding to the manipulated images in column 1.
The first three columns of rows 2, 4, and 6 show the differences between the activations of capsules 1 and 2, 1 and 3, and 2 and
3 on the corresponding row above, respectively. The three last columns in order show the differences between the activations
of capsules 1, 2, and 3 and the activation of the whole network.
Capsule 1 Capsule 2 Capsule 3Whole network(final)
1 - final 2 - final 3 - finalInput
Fig. 5. Example case in which one capsule did not work correctly. The first row shows the activation of the whole network and
of the three capsules. The second row from left to right shows the input image and the differences between the activation of
each capsule and of the whole network. Capsule 3 failed to detect the manipulated image, but thanks to the other two capsules,
the final result was still correct.
Capsule 1 Capsule 2 Capsule 3 Whole network(final)Input
Fig. 6. Activation of three primary capsules and of whole network for real input.
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Fig. 7. Agreement between three primary capsules and fake output capsule for fake input.
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Fig. 8. Agreement between three primary capsules and real output capsule for fake input.
For training, we used the Adam optimizer [73] with β1 =
0.9, β2 = 0.999, and a learning rate of 5 × 10−4. We used
a dropout rate of 5% and a batch size of 100 for 128 × 128
inputs and one of 32 for 300× 300 inputs. We used the exact
network architecture illustrated in Fig. 3.
For comparison with other methods, depending on the
database, we used three metrics.
• Equal error rate (EER): the value when the false ac-
ceptance rate (FAR) is equal to the false rejection rate
(FRR).
• Half total error rate: HTER = FRR+FAR2 .
• Classification accuracy = TP+TNTP+TN+FP+FN , where TP,
TN, FP, and FN are true positive, true negative, false
positive, and false negative, respectively.
4.1. Detecting Computer-Manipulated Images/Videos
In a test to detect computer-manipulated images and videos,
we used the FaceForensics++ database [27], which includes
three kinds of manipulations (deepfake [4], Face2Face [5],
and FaceSwap [27]) and three multiple compression levels
(no compression, light compression, and heavy compression).
The database was divided into a training set, a validation set,
and a test set, as shown in Table 1. For the training set, we
took the first 100 frames of the input video while for valida-
tion and test sets, we took only the first 10 frames. Since the
Capsule-Forensics network is not limited to binary classifi-
cation, we also evaluated its multi-class classification abil-
ity by changing the number of output capsules, from ‘Real’
and ‘Fake’ capsules to ‘Real’, ‘Deepfakes’, ‘Face2Face’, and
‘FaceSwap’ capsules. This modification is obvious and did
not require significant changes to the network architecture.
Table 1. Configuration of training, validation, and test sets
based on FaceForensics++ database [27].
Type Training set Validation set Test set
Real
720× 3 vids
72, 000× 3 imgs
140× 3 vids
1, 400× 3 imgs
140× 3 vids
1, 400× 3 imgs
Deepfakes
720× 3 vids
72, 000× 3 imgs
140× 3 vids
1, 400× 3 imgs
140× 3 vids
1, 400× 3 imgs
Face2Face
720× 3 vids
72, 000× 3 imgs
140× 3 vids
1, 400× 3 imgs
140× 3 vids
1, 400× 3 imgs
FaceSwap
720× 3 vids
72, 000× 3 imgs
140× 3 vids
1, 400× 3 imgs
140× 3 vids
1, 400× 3 imgs
We used a variation of the XceptionNet [76] as a base-
line classifier and trained it in accordance with the guidelines
used by Rossler et al. [27]. In this research, it achieved
state-of-the-art performance on detecting manipulated im-
ages. However, the XceptionNet is a large network with more
than 20 million parameters. We also compared the Capsule-
Forensics with new improvements from this work (Capsule-
Forensics light with three primary capsules and Capsule-
Forensics with ten primary capsules) with the previous ver-
sion (Capsule-Forensics (old)) [28], as listed in Table 2. The
previous version included three primary capsules and had the
option of adding random noise during the training process to
reduce overfitting. For the new versions, one of the new set-
tings enabled the use of a larger input size (300× 300 instead
of 128× 128), meaning that a larger number of important ar-
tifacts in the images. Another new setting enabled the use
of more capsules (ten capsules instead of three), which in-
creased the network capability. We call the 3-capsule version
the light one. The last new setting enabled the use of dropout
during the training process, which also played the role of a
regularizer. This final version is called Capsule-Forensics +
Dropout + Noise (300× 300) in Table 2. For simplicity,
we also evaluated the final version of the Capsule-Forensics
on video inputs by applying frame aggregation by calculat-
ing the average of the classification probabilities on the first
ten frames (named as Capsule-Forensics + Dropout + Noise
(video). All versions of Capsule-Forensics were trained with
25 epochs. The results for XceptionNet and all versions of
Capsule-Forensics on the test set are shown in Table 2.
As expected, the use of larger images improved the per-
formance of Capsule-Forensics substantially. Regarding ran-
dom noise, in our previous work [28], most of the training
sets were small, so random noise made a significant contri-
bution. In this work, we used the first 100 frames instead
of the first 10 for the training set, so the set was larger. Al-
though the random noise did not result in improvement in all
cases, it still played an important role in improving classifi-
cation accuracy and reducing the EER, especially when us-
ing it was used with dropout. Increasing the number of pri-
mary capsules also helped to improve performance. Com-
bining them together, The performance of Capsule-Forensics
with both random noise and dropout was almost the same
as that of XceptionNet even though the number of parame-
ters was five time smaller, which is significant. The effects
of these improvements on Capsule-Forensics performance is
clearer for multi-class classification, which is more difficult
than binary classification. For video input, the frame aggrega-
tion strategy increased classification accuracy for both binary
and multi-class classification, as was observed in our previous
work [28].
Beyond results shown in Table 2, we also performed
deeper analysis on multi-class classification by calculating the
classification accuracy for each class. As shown in Table 3,
a Face2Face attack was the most difficult one to detect for
both networks, especially for XceptionNet, with only 88.00%
accuracy. Using video inputs improved Capsule-Forensics
performance even more. However, XceptionNet performed
better on deepfakes detection, with accuracy of 94.81%. For
real input, both networks had slightly high false positive rates
compared with their false negative rates on the manipulated
inputs. Overall, Capsule-Forensics had more balanced per-
formance for all labels than XceptionNet.
Table 2. Results for all versions of Capsule-Forensics and baseline for images of various sizes except for last row showing
results for videos (‘light’ means new version of Capsule-Forensics with only three primary capsules).
Network Binary classificationaccuracy (%)
Binary classification
EER (%)
Multi-class classification
accuracy (%)
Number of
parameters
XceptionNet (299× 299) [27] 91.46 9.98 91.33 20,811,050
Capsule-Forensics (old) (128× 128) [28] 87.73 15.69 85.89 2,796,889
Capsule-Forensics (old) + Noise (128× 128) [28] 88.11 15.71 87.12 2,796,889
Capsule-Forensics light (300× 300) 90.02 10.95 87.51 2,796,889
Capsule-Forensics light + Noise (300× 300) 91.12 11.60 87.54 2,796,889
Capsule-Forensics (300× 300) 91.65 11.36 88.51 3,896,638
Capsule-Forensics + Noise (300× 300) 91.48 11.62 89.98 3,896,638
Capsule-Forensics light + Dropout (300× 300) 91.36 11.61 89.19 2,796,889
Capsule-Forensics light + Dropout + Noise (300× 300) 91.28 11.38 88.44 2,796,889
Capsule-Forensics + Dropout (300× 300) 92.20 10.96 90.51 3,896,638
Capsule-Forensics + Dropout + Noise (300× 300) 92.02 10.26 91.22 3,896,638
Capsule-Forensics + Dropout + Noise (video) 93.11 10.26 92.90 3,896,638
Table 3. Multi-class classification accuracy for FaceForensics++ database [27] (%).
Method Real Deepfakes Face2Face FaceSwap
XceptionNet (299× 299) [27] 89.43 94.81 88.00 92.76
Capsule-Forensics + Dropout + Noise (300× 300) 89.57 92.17 90.00 92.79
Capsule-Forensics + Dropout + Noise (video) 89.57 92.17 90.36 92.79
4.2. Detecting Fully Computer-Generated Images
In addition to testing Capsule-Forensics on computer-
manipulated image, we also trained it to classify fully
computer-generated images (CGIs) and photographic im-
ages (PIs). We used the dataset created by Rahmouni et
al. [26]. The CGI set contained 1800 high-resolution screen-
shots (around 1920 × 1080 pixels) from five photo-realistic
video games. The PI set included 1800 high-resolution pho-
tographic images (around 4900 × 3200) selected from the
RAISE dataset [77]. We followed the prescribed protocol
by training Capsule-Forensics on a 100 × 100 patch dataset
and evaluated it on both patch and full-scale datasets. Ac-
cordingly, the input images were only 100 × 100. For the
full-scale dataset, we used the same patch aggregation strat-
egy by calculating the average classification probability of all
patches. As shown in Table 4, both the old and new versions
of Capsule-Forensics outperformed the three other state-of-
the-art classifiers and achieved 100% classification accuracy
on the large-scale dataset.
Table 4. Accuracy of state-of-the-art methods on discriminat-
ing CGIs and PIs.
Method AccuracyPatch Large-scale
Rahmouni et al. [26] 89.76 99.30
Quan et al. [54] 94.75 99.58
Nguyen et al. [56] 96.55 99.86
Capsule-Forensics (old) [28] 97.00 100.00
Capsule-Forensics (new) 97.05 100.00
4.3. Detecting Presentation Attacks
In addition to the experiments demonstrating the ability of
Capsule-Forensics to detect images manipulated or gener-
ated by computer, we trained Capsule-Forensics on Idiap’s
Replay-Attack database [11]. Since the resolution of the
videos was 320 × 240, we center cropped each frame to
240 × 240 before inputting them. As shown in Table 5,
Nguyen et al.’s version [56] and Capsule-Forensics achieved
perfect results without any mistakes on any frames.
Table 5. Half total error rate (HTER) of state-of-the-art de-
tection methods on Replay-Attack database [11].
Method HTER (%)
Chigovska et al. [11] 17.17
de Freitas Pereira et al. [12] 08.51
Kim et al. [13] 12.50
Yang et al. [39] 02.30
Menotti et al. [40] 00.75
Alotabi et al. [44] 10.00
Ito et al. [14] 00.43
Nguyen et al. [56] 00.00
Capsule-Forensics (old) [28] 00.00
Capsule-Forensics (new) 00.00
5. CONCLUSION
Our proposed Capsule-Forensics method can be applied
to digital images and video forensics, including detecting
computer-manipulated/generated images and videos and de-
tecting presentation attacks. The improvements made have
given Capsule-Forensics performance that is equivalent to or
better than that of state-of-the-art methods on the tasks tested
while using fewer parameters, which helps reduce compu-
tation cost. Detailed analysis of how the Capsule-Forensics
works by visualizing the activation of each capsules and of
the whole network and by analyzing the agreement between
the primary capsules for video input explained the mecha-
nism which helped the Capsule-Forensics performed well on
several digital forensics tasks. With these promising results
and the understanding gained from detail analysis, this work
should lead to further research and development on capsule
networks, not only for digital forensics but in many other ar-
eas. Future work could include application of capsule net-
works to time series input, not simply using frame aggrega-
tion and improvement in the generability of capsule networks,
an active and challenging research topic in machine learning.
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